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THE GROWING FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
PANEL
DICK THORNBURGH*
CHARLES W. DANIELS"
ROBERT GORENCE**"
MR. THORNBURGH: The title of this session is "The Growing Federalization
of Criminal Law." I think we probably might amend that to say "The Growing
Federalization of Criminal Law.. .Until Lately," since the Supreme Court has lately
been taking some steps that restrict the application of federal criminal law. But let's
get into it. I'm going to begin with a discussion of the history of federal criminal
law. Chuck Daniels is going to give you something a little deeper in terms of the
constitutional principles. Then we'll follow up by having Bob Gorence talk about
some of the practical consequences.
I brought a quotation today from 1702, when Chief Justice Holt of the House
of Lords repeated the English legal maxim, "An Act of Parliament can do no wrong,
though it may do several things that look pretty odd."' To some extent, that's been
the history of federal criminal law. In the early days of the Republic, there was a
very limited catalog of federal criminal laws having to do with treason, piracy, and
counterfeiting, and then things that affected the administration of justice, such as
bribery, perjury, obstruction of justice, and the like. 2
It wasn't until the last third of the nineteenth century that there began to be more
substance in the federal criminal laws. Mail fraud was introduced largely as a result
of the widespread use of lotteries by state governments. 3 With the growth of the
nation and the advent of the Industrial Age, interstate commerce types of
wrongdoing began to be identified as federal offenses. 4 But federal criminal law
really didn't take off until the roaring twenties and the 1930s. In large part this was
due to the automobile, which gave a new mobility to wrongdoers, and along with
it an ability to cross state lines and put themselves beyond the jurisdiction of many
state and local officials. Bank robbery became a big-ticket federal offense.5 There
was also car theft, which used to be the staple for the FBI in their statistical

* Attorney at Law, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, Washington, D.C., and former United States Attorney
General.
** Attorney at Law, Freedman, Boyd, Daniels. Hollander, Goldberg & Cline P.A., Albuquerque, New
Mexico.
*** Attorney at Law. Albuquerque, New Mexico. At the time of this presentation, Mr. Gorence was an
assistant United States Attorney in the Albuquerque office.
1. City of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B. 1702).
2. Act of April 30, 1790, ch.lX, 1790 STAT. 112, 112-117 (providing punishment of certain crimes against
the United States).
3. See Act of March 3, 1873, ch. CCLVII], 1873 STAT. 598,598-600 (providing for the suppression of trade
in, and circulation of, obscene literature and articles of immoral use).
4. See, e.g., Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3594, 1906 STAT. 607, 607-608 (act to prevent cruelty to animals
while in transit over state or territorial borders); Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 395, 1910 STAT. 825, 825-827 (act
prohibiting the interstate transportation of women and girls for immoral purposes).
5. 18 U.S.C. §2113 (1994)(originally enacted as Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304, §§ 1-3, 48 STAT. 783).
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recitations, and kidnapping, largely as a result of the Lindbergh case. Of course,
with Prohibition and its whole progeny of racketeering and organized crime figures,
the use of the federal income tax laws as a criminal predicate became much more
prevalent-thanks to Al Capone, who was unable to be prosecuted federally on any
substantive offense but was convicted and sent to prison on tax violations.7
During the 1960s and 1970s, the time during which I served as a U.S. attorney
and as head of the criminal division of the Department of Justice in Washington, a
lot more effort was focused on organized crime and corruption. Congress aided the
effort through the so-called Travel Act of 1964, which made interstate travel in aid
of racketeering a federal offense.8 In 1968 and 1970, crime acts created new
substantive violations. Drug laws became much more aggressively used and
imaginative prosecutors resurrected the mall fraud statute9 and the Hobbs Act" and
utilized the new RICO statute," all to use against local racketeering and corruption.
During the 1980s and 1990s, during the time that I served as Attorney General,
the law in terms of criminal prosecution became much more international, again due
to technological change. Transportation and communication broke down national
boundaries, just as the automobile had broken them down at the state level in the
1930s. So we had new offenses in drug production and transportation outside the
United States that were prosecuted in this country. We also had money laundering
(where with the push of a button you could move illegal proceeds around the world
very easily), terrorism, and international white-collar crime.
By the time we reached this new century, the statistics tell us that forty percent
of all the federal criminal laws passed since the Civil War have been enacted since
1970.2 Nonetheless, we are still at a point where about ninety-five percent of the
criminal prosecutions in this country take place at the state and local level.
What we're looking at today, the centerpiece of our discussion today, is a new
phenomenon, where Congress acts on the "crime de jour." That is, an individual
congressman comes into his office, flips on the CNN morning news or reads the
headlines in the newspaper, sees some dreadful thing that's happening, and divines
that it should occasion the passage of a new federal criminal statute.
Consider just some of the more recent enactments that are now federal offenses:
car jacking; 3 drive-by shootings; 4 deadbeat dads;" interstate domestic violence;' 6
and violence against women through the Violence Against Women Act,'7 which was

6. See State v. Hauptnann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935). See also Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. 1201
(1994). (based on Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, §§ 1, 3,47 STAT. 326; Actof May 18, 1934, ch. 301,48 STAT. 781,
782).
7. See JOHN KOBLER, THE LIFE & WORLD OF AL CAPONE (1992).
8. Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
9. Mail Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1346 (1994).
10. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
11. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
12. Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section,
Federalization of Criminal Law (1999), available at http://www.abanetorg/crimjust/fedcrimlawl .pdf.
13. Anti-Car Theft Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
14. Drive-By Shooting Prevention Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994).
15. Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (Supp. 1998).
16. Interstate domestic violence provision of Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994).
17. Violence Against Women Act of 1994,42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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recently declared unconstitutional in part. 8 Every one of these statutes relates to
what are basically local violations. They were passed with very little in the way of
federal interest and have been scrutinized in the courts very carefully to determine
if they square with the Constitution.
The consequences of this explosion have been manifold. A little over a year ago,
the Chief Justice expressed in no uncertain terms that this explosion of federal
criminal law was not a good thing.' 9 An American Bar Association Task Force,
which rendered its report shortly thereafter, came to a similar conclusion.' The
reason is that the proliferation of these offenses potentially puts a great strain on the
system, and particularly on the courts, which are busy enough, as many of you
know. The speedy trial rules in criminal cases2 tend to crowd out civil litigation. In
addition, these duplicative laws create a great deal of confusion, not only among
criminals, which is not all bad, but among law enforcement officials as well. Perhaps
from the point of view of federal law enforcement, it holds the potential for
deflection of federal resources away from investigations that only the feds can do:
the kinds of sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional cases in organized crime,
racketeering, public corruption, white-collar crime, and the like that are often
beyond the reach of even the best state and local prosecutors, even when they have
the jurisdiction.
I'm going to move to Chuck Daniels to give us a little bit more meat on those
bones, if you will, from the point of view of constitutional law and the setting within
which these problems exist.
MR. DANIELS: Thanks. To really get a handle on what's happening now, I think
we have to go back a little bit in history. The Constitution, of course, established lots
of checks and balances, and one of the more clear ones is that the federal
government was not to have general police powers and substitute its role for that of
the states.' The enactment of federal criminal laws pretty well followed that model
for a long time, probably a century and a half, by and large. The kinds of things that
were regulated by federal criminal law were things that were exclusively described
in the Constitution, such as piracy on the high seas' and treason against the
government.' They were those things that are enumerated in the Constitution.
A second category of law addressed the integrity of the federal government itself.
A recent example, the Oklahoma City bombing case,25 was prosecuted initially in
federal court, even though the state had concurrent criminal jurisdiction, because it
was uniquely an attack on the federal government. Those kinds of laws were passed
early on.
18. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding neither the Commerce Clause nor the
Sixteenth Amendment provided constitutional authority for Congress to enact the civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act).
19. William H. Rehnquist, Address to the American Law Institute, in REMARKS AND ADDRESSES AT THE
75TH ANNUAL ALl MEETING, May 11, 1998, at 15-19 (1998).
20. See Federalization of Criminal Law, supra note 12, at 43-49.
21. Speedy Trial Act of 1974,18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994).
22. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8 (The Congress shall have Power... [t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies

committed on the high Seas.").
III, § 3 ('The Congress shall have the power to declare the Punishment of Treason.").
24. U.S. CONST. art.
25.

See United States v. McVeigh, 918 F.Supp. 1467 (W.D.Okla. 1996).
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The Commerce Clause 26 was another source of power, but Congress was fairly
sparing in enacting criminal legislation that directly dealt with it. Congress tended
to use the clause for things that directly related to commerce and not for things
related to commerce only through some tangential "but for" sort of analysis. Of
course, there is also the Necessary and Proper Clause,27 which is applied to all
federal government powers and provides congressional power for whatever is
necessary and proper to protect the ability of the federal government to carry out its
federal functions.28
That's the way it pretty well rested until the Civil War. The Civil War
amendments, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, 9 particularly
the Fourteenth Amendment, needed to be enforced. They were still enforced fairly
narrowly for almost a century after the Civil War. Other than sporadic changes in
the laws due to increasing interstate commercial traffic, Congress did the things that
Dick Thornburgh talked about. That was pretty well the situation until just the last
few decades of this century.
Most of the federal criminal laws that are now on the books are not only those
that have been enacted in the last few decades, but actually cover things that
traditionally have been addressed by state laws and clearly could be covered by state
laws. The primary motivating factor, which I agree with Dick Thomburgh on, is the
"crime de jour" element. Congress has a hard time refusing pressures to speak out
against whatever crime, local though it may be, that is affecting peoples' passions
at the moment. The car-jacking statute he mentioned was enacted because of
incidents that occurred outside the Beltway in Maryland, where the defendants,
incidentally, were prosecuted and convicted. under state homicide laws.30 But it
created such a visceral outrage that people wanted the big stick, the federal
government, to do something about it.
More recently, we saw efforts following that racial dragging incident over in
Texas where a black man was dragged to death behind a pickup truck.3 There were
pushes to enact a federal law, even though at the time it was being debated in
Congress the defendants were being prosecuted, with the death penalty being
sought. It's not that there is any vacuum of action, but it is the "crime de jour"
aspect of it that motivates Congress to act.
The hook that was usually used in enacting these statutes is the Commerce
Clause. It's the easiest one to use. The Court had not invalidated a congressional
statute on the basis of the Commerce clause since 1936, in the Carter Coal

26. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
27. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power.. .[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof").
28. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIL XIV, XV. The Amendments were ratified in 1865, 1868, and 1870,
respectively.
30. See Alan J. Craver, Basu carjackergiven life term with no parole: Solomon's crime called "outrageous
and inhumane," BAIT.SUN, August 19, 1993.
31. King v. Texas, 29 S.W.3d. 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Winter 20011

FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW

32
Company case. That was about the time Roosevelt proposed the Court Packing
Plan, and the Justices changed their composition a little bit and perhaps their view
a little bit more. If you remember that saying, "The switch in time that saved nine,"
it refers to the period when the Court started looking at the Constitution's principles
33
a little differently. Just six years later, the Court decided Wickard v. Filburn, the
little wheat patch case where a farmer was growing some wheat on his own land, not
to sell it, but to grind it up and make bread for his own family. The Supreme Court,
which had changed composition as well as views by 1942, said that despite the fact
that he was not planning to sell it in interstate commerce, Congress could
legitimately find that his use of the wheat to feed to his family meant that he would
buy less wheat in interstate commerce and therefore had an effect on interstate
commerce.
That case is really the epitome of the use of the Interstate Commerce Clause over
the decades pretty much since then, up until this new round of refined jurisprudence.
That's what I learned in law school and I think all of us did--that Congress can do
anything they darn well please under the Commerce Clause using that Wickard v.
Filburncase as an example. So most of these statutes that have been enacted over
the last few decades have been grounded on Commerce Clause jurisdiction,
although, you look at them and wonder, "What in the heck does this really have to
do with commerce?" They're really looking at some other activity they're trying to
regulate and saying that it has some kind of impact on commerce.
v. Perez,3 4
I think the best criminal example was the 1971 case United States
which upheld the loan sharking provision that was passed in 1968. The Court did
not require Congress to make any showing of any particular interstate nexus of loan
shark activity in order for Congress to give federal courts jurisdiction to prosecute
someone for it.35 Instead, the Court looked at the congressional hearings and said,
"Well, organized criminals are often involved in loan sharking, and organized36
it's okay.
criminal activity has a national impact on commerce, and, therefore,
That's the kind of analysis that was pretty much used.
37
The first real change came in 1995 with the UnitedStates v. Lopez case. I think
that was a real signal that the Supreme Court was no longer going to rubberstamp
anything Congress passed using the pretext of the Commerce Clause. In 1990,
Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act.38 One of the provisions made
39
possession of a firearm illegal within 1000 feet of a school. Again, the Act was
passed on the basis of the Commerce Clause, purportedly because violence has a
substantial impact on interstate commerce and people don't want to travel to places
with dangerous schools---the same sort of reasoning that had gotten Congress by all
those years. A five-Justice majority held that this couldn't be justified under the

32. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 299-301 (1936).
33. 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
34. 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971).
35. kd
36. Id. at 157.
37. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
38. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988, Supp. V) (invalidated by United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
39. Id. at §922(q)(2)(A).
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Commerce Clause. 40 It was the same five-Justice majority that is following through
on Lopez to this day. I'll get to a case that was decided just this last month, the other
most significant one of the last several decades, I think, in this area. The Lopez
decision surprised a lot of commentators and analysts because the Court made such
a break from its previous hands-off approach when it said, "Wait a minute. Carrying
a gun to a school is not an economic activity."
Of course, everything ultimately has an impact in the sense that dropping a pebble
at one side of the ocean affects the molecules on the other side. Everything has an
impact in interstate commerce, but that's not really what the Interstate Commerce
Clause was intended to address. If you use that analysis, it makes all the limitations
on federal government power in the criminal area completely meaningless. By that
analysis, you could uphold federal statutes such as general statutes against murder.
Murder certainly has as much impact on interstate commerce as carrying a gun near
a school or rape or robbery or all the garden-variety state criminal offenses.
The analogy is not meant to downplay the importance of criminal law addressing
those offenses. It's really just a question of which court system is sovereign-that
is, which court system has the responsibility and the right to deal with it. Lopez said
that there are three ways you can look at whether the Commerce Clause is involved.
One is the use of the channels of interstate commerce, interstate transportation, and
so on. The second test is the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the particular activity at the moment is
purely intrastate. The third test-and this is the one that is really where the
battleground
is found-is those activities having a substantial effect on interstate
41
commerce.

The Court didn't overrule the Wickard v. Filburn case, or any other precedent,
and cited those cases as examples of things that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 42 But the Court said the activity addressed in the statute at issue
in Lopez, carrying 43a gun near a school, was not economic activity. It's not really
commerce in itself
Also, Congress had made no findings before passing the statute. Congress had
gotten so used to being able to pass criminal laws like this that it didn't bother
making any findings about the interstate commerce connection of carrying guns near
schools; nothing in the statute indicated that. The Court said that alone is not
dispositive, but it certainly made it more difficult for the Court to find any kind of
interstate commerce effect to uphold the statute."
40.
41.
42.
43.

The majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
Id. at 559-60.
The Court stated that the statute
is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be
sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce.
Id. at 561.
44. The Court stated,
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an
activity has on interstate commerce. But to the extent that congressional findings would enable
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no plenary
Erie v. Tompkins says the Constitution gives the federal government
4" Congress has
states.
the
to
power, no general criminal law power; that's reserved
to act within an enumerated power and demonstrate some kind of traceable
connection in order to justify legislation, instead of piling inference on inference in
a manner that would give a general police power, as in murder, rape, and robbery.
If it doesn't, there will never be a distinction between what's ruled national and
what's local power.
4
Justice Thomas had an interesting opinion in Lopez, and he carries the view
even to this day. He would go even further in the direction of federal limitations
than the other four Justices of the five-Justice block. He said that he would
47
reevaluate the substantial effects test. He thinks even that gives too much to
Congress. He thinks the Court ought to look at whether this is truly a regulation of
interstate commerce, or something else, and not just allow Congress to use interstate
commerce as a jurisdictional hook.4'
There has been a lot of reaction in the legal community, by commentators and by
courts, to the Lopez opinion, because it was such a break. It was not a break from
precedent technically, but it was a break from the application of precedent in a way
that departed from law that existed for decades. The effect in the courts was fairly
limited. You can search the law books. You won't find very many lower court cases
that applied Lopez to other contexts and invalidated legislation. By and large, the
were still applying older precedent in the way they had been applied before
courts 49
Lopez.
The next real shot from the Supreme Court came just this last month in May
[2000]. During that time Congress continued to pass "crime de jour" statutes,
addressing things that have been traditionally dealt with by local law. There seems
to be almost two lines of action by the federal government here. Even though in
theory the conflict is between the states and the federal government, the more
interesting conflict is between Congress and the courts, two branches of the federal

us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they
are lacking here.
Id. at 562-63 (citation and footnote omitted).
45. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
46. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-602.
47. Justice Thomas stated, "In an appropriate case, Ibelieve that we must further reconsider our 'substantial

effects' test with an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause
without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). He further stated that the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence has given Congress power that has
swallowed Art I. § 8 and is coming close to turning the Tenth Amendment on its head. Our case
law could be read to reserve to the United States all powers not expressly prohibited by the
Constitution. Taken together, these fundamental textual problems should, at the very least,
convince us that the "substantial effects" test should be reexamined.
Id. at 589 (Thomas, J., concurring).
48. Referring to the sweeping nature of the substantial effects test, Justice Thomas stated, "[O]ne always
can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity that, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial
effects on commerce." Id. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring).
49. See generally United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d
213 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582
(10th Cir. 2000).
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government fighting over where the lines are to be drawn under our federalism.
That's really where the battle has been fought.
The states in some instances have been sort of bystanders on this whole dispute.
Although you will find a lot of state officials who are unhappy with the feds
gradually taking over areas that have been traditionally taken care of by the states,
the federal government as a whole is sort of like the 600-pound gorilla in that old
question, "Where does a 600-pound gorilla sleep? Anywhere it wants to." But, both
Congress and the Court have federal power, and they've been going in two separate
directions, at least for the last half-decade.
Congress continues to pass these laws, and I don't think they're going to stop. I
don't think .they're going to stop because of this more recent opinion, Morrison,0
either, and there are some strong indications that they won't. It probably doesn't
make a lot of difference to them, because the reason that they're passing a lot of this
is for the political benefit or to protect themselves from political attack. They can
always say, "Well, that isn't my job; it's the courts' job." And of course throw in the
people's will. There have been some statements that indicate that's the sort of
approach they're going to take.
But while Congress has been expanding its activity, the Court is trying to rein it
in. The Morrison case was actually a civil case, but it has a lot of implications for
the issue that we're talking about here because it does deal with the Commerce
Clause justification for passing federal laws. The subject of the case is the Violence
Against Women Act,"' which Dick Thornburgh just mentioned, and the Act
addresses a serious problem regarding sexual violence against women. It's a
problem throughout the country.
That alone does not give Congress the authority to regulate in this area, but
Congress held four years of sporadic hearings on it and made specific findings,
unlike in Lopez, that violence against women-sexual violence-affected women's
abilities to get jobs and earn income and contribute to the national economy. It
affects their willingness to travel and their ability to travel, those kinds of things that
traditionally, at least in the last half-century, have been used to uphold assertions of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.52 The same five-Justice majority
of the Supreme Court again followed up on its decision in Lopez and said that the
Act was an unconstitutional assertion of congressional power."
The statute itself had provisions that allowed the victim to sue the wrongdoer, and
it also had criminal provisions that made it an offense to travel in interstate
commerce, or travel interstate in order to commit violence.' That criminal provision
really wasn't at issue in the case. In a footnote, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that the

50. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
51. 42 U.S.C. §13981 (1994).
52. H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801; S. REP. NO. 103138, at 40 (1993).
53. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
54. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994 § 40221(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1)(1994) (providing for
punishment of "interstate crimes of abuse including crimes committed against spouses or intimate partners during
interstate travel and crimes committed by spouses or intimate partners who cross State Lines to continue the abuse").
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Court was not addressing that." I wonder, however, what will happen when that
issue in Morrison56
case reaches the Court, but only the civil provisions were at
Even though Congress made findings about the impact on interstate commerce,
the Court said that the statute wasn't really about the economic impact of domestic
give the
violence. 5" The Court again questioned that reasoning, because it would
58
federal government a general police power that is left to the states. The Court
upheld a district court decision that found that the Commerce Clause did not justify
59
this assertion of congressional power and invalidated the statute. In doing so, the
Court again held on to precedent, and the majority held on to the substantial effects
test.' But they said in reality that there was no substantial effect and the fact that
Congress made the findings did not absolve the Court of its constitutional
responsibilities to look at the reality of what was happening. Otherwise, just a
recitation would allow Congress to usurp the Constitution.'
62
In comments immediately afterward, Senator Joseph Biden, Jr., who was the
primary sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act, made a statement to the press
and said, "This decision is really all about power, who has the power, the Court or
the Congress." ' 3 Rehnquist anticipated that question and in the opinion he said,
"Ever since Marbury, this Court has remained the ultimate expository of the
constitutional text."' Unlike the Parliament that Dick Thornburgh mentioned could
do no wrong, under our system of government, the Court does have the power to
review the actions of Congress.
Thus, one of the battles being fought is whether Congress has the raw power to
assert jurisdiction in areas that have been traditionally dealt with by the states. And
that's one of the areas where the fight will continue. While the Supreme Court
refines its views and the changes on the Court either strengthen those views or go
back the other way, you might find some of the senators asking Court nominees
about their views on federalism and congressional power and so on for those
appointments, just as we have seen people being quizzed on their beliefs on the
Miranda doctrine65 in Washington when they come up for confirmation to the
Supreme Court.
It's really hard to predict what's going to happen in this area, but in some ways
the legal issues are not so important as the philosophical issues-that is, knowing
where the line is drawn on the raw power of the federal government to act. The real
policy question is, where does it make sense for the federal government to assert its
power, and where does it make sense for the state government to assert its power

55. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5.
56. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994 § 40302,42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (invalidated by Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
57. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
58. See id
59. ld. at617-18.
60. See id. at 608-610.
61. See id. at614-16.
62. Democratic Senator from Delaware.
63. 146 CONG. REC. S3970 (daily ed. May 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Biden).
64. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7.
65. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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under our general federalism scheme? A lot of that deals with the practical realities
of this kind of federalization.
I will turn this over to Bob Gorence to deal with that because he has had a lot of
experience over the years in his various positions, including the position of head
prosecutor in this district for several years, and he has a lot of experience dealing
with the effects of this kind of federalization.
MR. GORENCE: Thanks, Chuck. My nametag says "Assistant United States
Attorney," but the opinions I'm about to espouse are my own, not those of the
department.
I was the acting United States Attorney for the past six months, the first assistant
criminal chief for the past six years, and I have some observations about what
happens when you are going from the "crime de jour," as Chuck called it, to the "bill
de jour," by virtue of political pressures that you talked about, and then to the "law
de jour." More specifically, I want to talk about what happens when a "law de jour"
gives separate sovereigns-both federal and state prosecutors--concurrent
jurisdiction.
With concurrent jurisdiction, when law enforcement agents believe they have a
prosecutable case, they face a choice as to which prosecutor to present the case to.
Almost without exception certain factors come into play when making that decision,
because law enforcement agents and prosecutors are looking to find the most
hospitable venue for the case.
w " from this last Term
The Jones case
of the Supreme Court presented an
interesting question about the choice between state and federal venues. In Jones, the
indictment alleged interstate arson, but in reality it was a quintessentially local
offense. The defendant was a young man who was quite unhappy with his cousin for
some reason, and he tossed a Molotov cocktail through the front window of an
owner-occupied building and destroyed the building.6 7 Either the police in
Indianapolis or the fire marshal called in the ATF." After the investigation was
completed, agents and prosecutors faced a decision.
Justice Stevens' concurrence illuminates exactly how this case was pursued in
federal court. The concurrence states, "The fact that petitioner received a sentence
of thirty-five years in prison when the maximum penalty for the comparable state
offense was only ten years illustrates how a criminal law like this may effectively
displace a policy choice made by the state. Even when Congress has undoubted
power to pre-empt local law, we have wisely decided that unless Congress conveys
its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federalstate balance."69
With mandatory minimum statutes promulgated by Congress for both the use of
an explosive device and interstate arson, the law enforcement discussion in
Indianapolis probably went something like this, "We can perhaps get a ten-year
sentence in state court, but if we take it over to the feds, this individual," as the
expression goes, "is whacked with thirty-five." I can tell you that that discussion
66.
67.
68.
69.

Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
Id at 851.
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, a federal agency.
Jones, 529 U.S. at 859-860 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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happens day in and day out in prosecutors' offices across the nation. Congress needs
to understand that in federalizing criminal law-in essence providing concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction-it's giving extraordinary discretion and power to
prosecutors. That's the practical effect of many of these "crime de jour, bill de jour"
statutes becoming law.
There are other factors besides just the potential for incarceration that can affect
the decision of who prosecutes the case. Issues such as forfeiture potential and
discovery differences can affect the state versus federal venue question. Asset
forfeiture under New Mexico state law is different from federal law, as are the
incarceration schemes. I don't think it would surprise too many people if I said that
by and large most agents and prosecutors seek the venue with the greatest potential
incarceration and forfeiture possibilities with the least discovery obligations.
As a result, most United States Attorney offices have developed case acceptance
guidelines that try to curb their discretion by articulating what cases involve a real
federal interest. But I can tell you it's an ongoing issue, at least it was in the six
years I was the first assistant/criminal chief. We tried to look at each individual case
in a measured way to determine the precise federal interest so that case acceptance
decisions did not vary from one assistant United States attorney to the next.
Another question, after a local crime problem has been federalized as7 it was in
Richmond with the "Project Exile" gun cases, what is the exit strategy? ' The city
of Richmond realized they had such a high local homicide rate and violent crime
rate that they, in essence, turned over every single offense that involved a firearm
to the federal government, and those cases were prosecuted under federal firearm
statutes, which carry mandatory minimum sentences. 7 The crime rate has been
reduced, but do the feds ever leave?
It's interesting what happens, at least from my perspective, when you have one
United States attorney in the country with a federalization policy like this.
Community leaders and local law enforcement question why you're not doing the
same thing in your particular district. Because crime rates have been cut in
Richmond, there's pressure to emulate the strategy in other United States attorney's
offices. Once you embark on a federalization strategy, though, it's very hard to ever
get off of it. An example is the Weed-and-Seed projects that have been undertaken
in New Mexico. Weed-and-Seed is a federal strategy that actually started when Dick
Thornburgh was the Attorney General. Through the program, the federal law
72
enforcement intervenes in high crime areas with a very strong presence. After the
bad guys have been removed, the area is sprinkled with a lot of federal money,
putting in basketball programs and afternoon-school programs around the
neighborhood. Sometimes it's more than a sprinkling, sometimes it's a dousing. But
by and large, it's been very successful. The problem comes with its success, because
now it's very hard to get the federal government out of the picture. Once a particular
Weed-and-Seed community realizes that all these cases are going federal-all the

70. See Jeff Jones, Guns Last Blast Is Best, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 1, 2000, at DI.
71. Id.
72. See Rebecca Roybal, Serious Fun, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 19, 1999, at B8.
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gun cases, all the dope cases-and crime rates get reduced and money comes
pouring in, the federal exit strategies become very difficult.
Those are my thoughts. Again, I just add the concept that concurrent jurisdiction
means great discretion on the part of prosecutors. That's the practical effect, as long
as Congress is comfortable with that.
THORNBURGH: Let me toss out a couple of comments. First of all, I want to
agree with Chuck's characterization that this is not a federal-state controversy so
much as it is a congressional controversy with the courts. In point of fact, in the
Violence Against Women Act case, which is a case where an essentially local crime
was federalized, you had thirty-eight state attorneys general as amicus curiae before
the Court seeking to have that statute upheld,13 which is contraindicated if there were
a real federal-state controversy going on.
The second thing I wanted to pick up on was what Bob said about Project Exile
and about these concurrent jurisdiction cases. There is room in the system, in my
view, for some cooperation in particular areas, but it is very, very tricky. When you
have a Project Exile-type blanket assumption of jurisdiction, it creates, in my view,
a lot more problems than it may solve. We had a similar program back in the early
part of the 1990s called Operation Trigger Lock, which was authorized by the
Armed Career Criminal Act. 74 The program was designed to, in close cooperation
between federal and state prosecutors, identify the most egregious gun violators and
throw the book at them. That was used selectively in a way that did maximize the
sentence consequences for an act that at a local level would have oftentimes resulted
in a walk. Some of the anecdotal evidence that you got out of this was really quite
astonishing. People who had been dancing through the raindrops using firearms in
criminal offenses all of a sudden got hit with a fifteen-year minimum mandatory
sentence-no probation, no parole, no nothing. They were going to do hard time. I
felt that in that case and in some of the major drug trafficking cases there was great
potential if you could work out the guidelines for cooperation, but I think it is a
mistake to federalize all of those cases.
One comment I can't resist, Bob, is regarding your comment about the
department. 75 I served as United States Attorney for six years in my hometown of
Pittsburgh and then in 1975 was asked by Attorney General Ed Levi to come to
Washington to be assistant attorney general in Washington and head of the criminal
division. When I was getting ready to go down there, my wife said to me, "You
know, for six years all I've heard you do is complain about the department. The
department makes you do this, the department does that, blah, blah, blah. Buster,
now you are the department." She was indeed right; that kind of constructive tension
does play out there.

73. Brief of the States of Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, and the Commonwealths of
Massachusetts and Puerto Rico, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)(Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
74. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1994).
75. Department of Justice.
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I'm going to take a couple of minutes more to get something off my chest,
because I think this discussion about the federalization ignores a larger problem that
we have with regard to the federal criminal law and that's this: we have no true
federal criminal code. We have some 3000-plus offenses that are scattered
throughout some fifty different titles of the United States Code. For example, we
have 232 theft offenses, 250 false statement offenses, ninety-nine forgery and
counterfeiting offenses, ninety-six property destruction offenses, and a whole
catalog of definitions with regard to criminal state of mind. And, I think, it really is
fraught with more significance than just the orderly mind wanting to see these things
done in an organized way. A criminal code was proposed based on the American
Law Institute Model Penal Code76 during the 1970s when I was in the department,
and I found there really wasn't much political capital to be made in bringing some
sense to this chaos.
Implicit in this discussion of federalization is the idea that we're dealing with a
so-often-called criminal code that is not worthy of the name and provides all kinds
of potential for mischief in pinning new types of offenses on it. Out of these some
3000 offenses, there are only about 1700 that are truly criminal in nature as we think
of them, as malum in se, the old English common law term. The others are
regulatory offenses. These days, when Congress passes any kind of statute, the last
provision is always automatically criminalizing any violation of previous provisions
and requirements. That just compounds the consequences of the lack of organization
of the criminal code and vastly increases the offenses that characterize our criminal
law.

76. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

